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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court of the United States reinterpreted the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' and stated that it "create[d] a 'liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration. "2 As a result, arbitration has become a
commonplace method of dispute resolution in many different arenas; one
arena in which arbitration is being utilized with controversy and increasing
frequency is within the consumer-lender or consumer-vendor relationship.
Many lenders and vendors currently are including arbitration clauses into
standardized lending and retail installment contracts as a means to
efficiently resolve their disputes with consumers dissatisfied with services
rendered to them or with the terms of an agreement.
While the inclusion of arbitration agreements may be beneficial to the
lender,3 consumer advocates are quick to point out that such agreements
have serious adverse effects upon how consumers are able to protect
themselves against duplicity on the part of a lender or vendor.4 Indeed,
consumers frequently challenge the validity of such clauses when embroiled
in a dispute with vendors or lenders because they are often more favorable
to vendors and lenders, as such clauses provide vendors and lenders with
dispute resolution options outside the arbitration process while limiting
consumers to just arbitration.
Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp.5 involved a challenge to the
validity of an arbitration clause as described above. In Harris, the
* 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
2 Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building
Barriers to Consumer Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302, 302 (1999) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
3 Some of the advantages of arbitration include the following: (1) arbitration
theoretically is a cheaper means of dispute resolution than the judicial system; (2)
parties have control over the procedural rules of resolution; (3) arbitration improves the
ability of the winning party to enforce its judgment; and (4) arbitration allows parties to
select their arbitrator. See Andrew Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing
Countries: A Proposal, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 607, 640-43 (1999).
4 See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause:
Drafting and Implementation Issues Which Should Be Considered by a Consumer
Lender, in CONSuMER FiNANIAL SERvicEs LmGATION 1999, at 655, 657 (PLI
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1113, 1999); see also infra
text accompanying note 47.
5 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
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plaintiffs, lower-middle class consumers, challenged the validity of an
arbitration agreement that was a part of a standardized contract between
themselves and the defendants, comprised of the Green Tree Financial
Corporation, one of its subsidiaries, and several home-improvement
contractors. 6 An examination of the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Harris is instructive regarding the manner
in which two competing interests-a federal interest favoring arbitration
and the interest in fostering consumer protection-have become entangled
as a result of using arbitration in consumer contracts and elucidates the
different legal rationales that courts have employed to validate or invalidate
such arbitration agreements in this context.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF HARRIS
On February 14, 1997, Charles Harris, Christine Harris, Willie Davis,
and Nora Wilson (the Harrises) brought a claim in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Green Tree
Financial Corporation (Green Tree), Green Tree Consumer Discount
Company (GT Discount), Lawrence M. Coss, Green Tree's Chief
Executive Officer, and building contractors Fredmont Builders, P. Angelo
& Son's, Inc., Frank R. Lucci, Jr., and Tyrone DeNittis, alleging that the
named defendants collectively had victimized them through a fraudulent
home improvement scheme. 7
The alleged fraudulent home improvement scheme purportedly operated
as follows. Green Tree recruited dozens of home improvement contractors
through direct marketing techniques for the purpose of obtaining high
interest rate secondary mortgage contracts from homeowners. 8 Green Tree
allegedly instructed the contractors to offer their services for home
improvements primarily to middle-income and low-income senior citizens
in exchange for secondary mortgage contracts. 9 Furthermore, Green Tree
allegedly instructed the contractors to market themselves as home
improvement dealers who had been approved by both the Federal Housing
Authority and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
and to promise customers that the home improvements would be performed
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at an affordable cost and that payment would not have to be tendered by the
customers until they were completely satisfied. 10
Using "high-pressure sales tactics" such as "in-home sales and
telemarketing," the contractors solicited business from the Harrises.11 As a
predicate to commencing work on the Harrises' homes, the relevant
contractor allegedly presented the Harrises with several standardized loan
contracts for signature, including a secondary mortgage contract, and the
Harrises obliged.' 2 The secondary contracts signed by the Harrisses
included the following arbitration clause in small print on the back and near
the bottom of the contracts:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or
relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this
contract, or the validity of this arbitration clause or the entire contract,
shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us
with consent of you. This arbitration contract is made pursuant to a
transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1. Judgment upon the award rendered
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. The parties agree and
understand that they choose arbitration instead of litigation to resolve
disputes. The parties understand that they have a right or opportunity to
litigate disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve their
disputes through arbitration, except as provided herein. THE PARTIES
VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY
HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY
US (AS PROVIDED HEREIN). The parties agree and understand that all
disputes arising under the case law, statutory law, and all other laws
including, but not limited to, all contract, tort, and property disputes, will
be subject to binding arbitration in accord with this contract. The parties
agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by
the law and the contract. These powers shall include all legal and equitable
remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief. Notwithstanding anything hereunto the
contrary, we retain an option to use judicial or non-judicial relief to
enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security agreement relating to
the real property secured in a transaction underlying this arbitration
agreement, or to enforce the monetary obligation secured by the real
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take the form of a lawsuit. The institution and maintenance of an action
for judicial relief in a court to foreclose upon any collateral, to obtain a
monetary judgment or to enforce the mortgage or deed of trust, shall not
constitute a waiver of the right of any party to compel arbitration
regarding any other dispute or remedy subject to arbitration in the
contract, including the filing of a counterclaim in a suit brought by us
pursuant to this provision. 13
Thus, the arbitration clause required that the Harrises arbitrate any claims
against Green Tree and the other defendants, while preserving Green Tree's
right to bring a lawsuit to enforce their rights under the mortgage contract.
The contractors allegedly sold and assigned the loans and mortgages to
Green Tree or GT Discount immediately after the Harrises signed them. 14
Thereafter, the Harrises alleged that the contractors either failed to
perform the work specifically promised in the contracts or performed the
work promised in the contracts but in an unsatisfactory manner. 15 The
Harrises complained to Green Tree regarding the unsatisfactory work by
the contractors on several occasions, all of which apparently were
disregarded by Green Tree. 16 Despite their dissatisfaction with the work
done by the contractors, the Harrises nonetheless paid Green Tree
according to the terms of the contracts for fear of losing their homes. 17
As a result of the alleged fraudulent conduct of Green Tree and the
other defendants, the Harrises brought suit alleging a violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) i8 and the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. 19 The
Harrises also alleged the common-law claims of breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious
interference with a contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent
misrepresentation. 20
Responding to the Harrises' suit, Green Tree and the other defendants
moved the court to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause
13 Id. at 177-78.
14 See id. at 176-77.
15 See id. at 177.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994); see also Harris, 183 F.3d at 177.
19 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to 201-9.3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); see
also Harris, 183 F.3d at 177.
20 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 177.
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elucidated above.21 Furthermore, Green Tree requested a stay on all
proceedings regarding the suit until completion of the arbitration
proceedings. 22
The Harrises filed an opposing motion against arbitration on May 30,
1997, arguing that the arbitration clause was invalid and unenforceable for
the following reasons: (1) the arbitration clause lacked the requisite
mutuality; (2) the arbitration clause was unconscionable; and (3) the
arbitration clause could not be enforced because the Harrises had been
fraudulently induced to enter the contract. 23
After a hearing on Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration, the trial
court denied the motion to arbitrate, claiming that the arbitration clause
"purports to bind only one of the contracting parties, the plaintiff
borrower" and "leaves [Green Tree] free to litigate their claims if they wish
to do so"; the court further classified the contract as a "one-sided
arrangement" that was "unconscionable." 24 Thus, the trial court found that
the arbitration clause of the secondary mortgage contract lacked the
requisite mutuality and furthermore found the arbitration clause as
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 25 When the trial court
denied their motion, Green Tree and the other defendants appealed.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 178.
24 See id. (alteration in original).
25 See id. Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process through which a
contract has been made between parties and the form of such contract. See id. at 6
(citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 4.28, at 332-34 (2d ed. 1990). This
type of unconscionability often involves unexpected terms in the boilerplate language of
a contract, see id. (citing Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145-46
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)), or contractual terms that are not expected by the party that is
expected to assent to such terms, see Rawlinson, 491 A.2d at 146-47. Substantive
unconscionability pertains to contractual provisions between two parties which are
extremely unfavorable to one party and to which the unfavored party does not assent.
See Harris, 183 F.3d at 181 (citing Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1068
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)). The trial court held that the arbitration agreement was a "one-
sided arrangement" and was thus "unconscionable." Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
No. 97-1128, 1997 WL 805254, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1997), rev'd, 183 F.3d 173
(3d Cir. 1999).
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IlI. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The Third Circuit first addressed the issue of whether the arbitration
clause was unenforceable due to a lack of mutuality2 6 and reversed the
decision of the trial court.27 The court declined to adopt the requirement of
complete equivalency of obligation on the part of the parties, 28 stating that
"[m]odem contract law largely has dispensed with the requirement of
reciprocal promises, however, provided that a contract is supported by
sufficient consideration." 29 Citing its decision in Becker Autoradio U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH,30 the court stated that mutuality is not
required for a valid arbitration clause. 31 The court further stated that its
holding that arbitration agreements do not require mutuality is consistent
with federal and state law and that the state of Pennsylvania does not
require an agreement of equivalent obligation for a valid contract. 32
The Third Circuit also ruled against the plaintiffs regarding the issue of
whether the arbitration provisions were procedurally and substantively
26 The doctrine of mutuality maintains that in order for a contract to be valid, both
parties to said contract must exchange reciprocal promises. See FARNSWORTH, supra
note 25, § 3.2, at 113.
27 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 184. Generally, questions regarding the construction of
arbitration clauses and agreements are questions of federal law. See Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). However,
federal courts may apply state law pursuant to section 2 of the FAA, thus allowing a
party questioning the validity of an arbitration agreement to apply contract defenses
(e.g., lack of consideration or unconscionability) without contravening federal law. See
Harris, 183 F.3d at 179 (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996)).
28 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 180.
29 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981)).
30 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978). In Becker, an American company (Becker
Autoradio U.S.A., Inc.) disputed the validity of an arbitration clause of their contract
with a West German company (Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH) because the arbitration
clause enabled the West German company to invoke arbitration in either an American
or a German court, while it could invoke arbitration only in an American court. See id.
at 42. Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. argued that Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH's
ability to choose a forum for the resolution of disputes constituted a lack mutual
obligation. See id. at 47 n. 15. The Third Circuit declined to find a requirement of
equivalency of obligation for contracts under federal law, stating that such an argument
has "no support in logic, reason or precedent." Id.
31 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 180.
32 See id. at 180-81.
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unconscionable. 33 Regarding procedural unconscionability, the court held
that the fact that the arbitration clause was in fine print on the reverse side
of the standard form contracts that the Harrises signed did not make the
arbitration clause procedurally unconscionable, because such contracts were
still within the plain view of the Harrises. 34 Regarding substantive
unconscionability, the Third Circuit held that an unequal balance of
bargaining power in an arbitration arrangement does not in itself make the
arbitration clause unconscionable. 35 Furthermore, the court held that the
FAA provided the Harrises with the option to petition the court to appoint
an arbitrator if they did not consent to Green Tree's choice. 36 Thus, the
33 See id. at 183-84.
34 See id. at 182. The Harrises presented the argument that the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable because the clause was in fine print on the reverse side
of the relevant standard form contracts and because the arbitration clauses were absent
from the work orders that the defendants required them to sign before the defendants
would commence work. See id. The court utilized both federal and state law to find the
arbitration agreement enforceable, contrary to the arguments presented by the Harrises.
See id. at 182-83. The court cited two cases decided by the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Troshak v. Terminix International Co., No.
CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998), and McCullough v.
Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., Nos. CIV.A.86-2752 to 86-2758, CIV.A.87-1431 to
87-1435, CIV.A.87-1499, CIV.A.87-1576 to 87-1579, CIV.A.1644, 1988 WL 23008
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988), which supported the court's general proposition that an
arbitration clause not printed in a prominent part of a contract, but nonetheless within
the clear and plain view of the opposing party, is valid. See Harris, 183 F.3d at 182.
The court also rationalized its decision using state law, citing Standard Venetian Blind
Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 469 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1983), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a failure to read the contract or a lack of
knowledge of a clearly drafted contractual provision does not provide grounds for the
avoidance of the contract, see id. at 566; see also Harris, 183 F.3d at 182.
35 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 183 (citing Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 33 (1991))). The Harrises presented the argument that the arbitration
agreement was substantively unconscionable because the agreement granted Green Tree
the option of litigating its disputes while limiting the Harrises to arbitration as a means
to resolve their dispute and because the arbitration agreement permitted Green Tree to
obtain an arbitrator without the Harrises' consent. See id. The court cited federal case
law such as Peacock, 110 F.3d at 229, to support its holding that inequality in
bargaining power is not in itself enough to justify a finding of unconscionability. See
Harris, 183 F.3d at 183.
36 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 183-84. The court based this conclusion upon the
following language from section 5 of the FAA:
329
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Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the District Court with
directions to grant the defendants' motion to stay and to enforce the
arbitration agreement. 37
IV. ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit's holding enforcing Green Tree's arbitration clause,
interestingly enough, comes on the heels of Randolph v. Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama,38 in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit found an arbitration clause nearly identical to the
arbitration clause at issue in Harris unenforceable. 39 In Randolph, the
arbitration clause in controversy was part of a retail installment contract for
the purchase of a mobile home between the plaintiff, Larketta Randolph,
and Better Cents Home Builders, Inc.40  Green Tree Financial
Corporation-Alabama, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Green Tree, was an
assignee of the retail installment contract between Randolph and Better
Cents Home Builders, Inc. 41 As part of the retail installment contract,
Green Tree required Randolph to obtain "vendor's single interest"
insurance; 42 however, Green Tree failed to mention this requirement as part
of their Truth in Lending Act43 disclosure. 44
If in the [arbitration] agreement provision be made for a method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator ... [,] such method shall be followed; but if no method
be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to
avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in
the naming of an arbitrator ... [,] then upon the application of either party to the
controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator... who shall act
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he... had been
specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the
arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994); see also Harris, 183 F.3d at 184 & n.10. Thus, the court
interpreted the above language as a manifestation of the Harrises' right to petition to
appoint an arbitrator under section 5 of the FAA.
37 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 184.
38 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999).
39 See id. at 1151, 1159.
40 See id. at 1151.
41 See id.
42 "Vendor's single interest" insurance operates to protect a lien holder or a
vendor against the costs of repossession should default occur. Id. at 1151.
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The Truth in Lending Act
is a consumer protection statute that regulates the disclosure of credit terms by creditors
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Randolph brought suit against Green Tree Financial Corporation-
Alabama and Green Tree, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act
on the part of the defendants for, inter alia, failing to disclose their
requirement of vendor's single interest insurance and the requirement that
all claims be subject to arbitration45 as set forth in the retail installment
and provides for remedial measures for consumers against creditors who do not comply
with the regulations of the statute. See id. The purpose of the statute is to "assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit, and to protect the consumer against unfair credit billing and credit card
practices." Id. § 1601(a).
44 See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1151; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1637a (setting
forth the Truth in Lending Act's disclosure requirements).
45 The arbitration clause in controversy provided as follows:
17. ARBITRATION: All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or
relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract, or the
validity of this arbitration clause or the entire Contract, shall be resolved by
binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by Assignee with consent of
Buyer(s). This arbitration Contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate
commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C.
Section 1. Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction. The parties agree and understand that they choose arbitration instead
of litigation to resolve disputes. The parties understand that they have a right or
opportunity to litigate disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve their
disputes through arbitration, except as provided herein. THE PARTIES
VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO
A JURY TRIAL EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS
CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS
PROVIDED HEREIN). The parties agree and understand that all disputes arising
under case law, statutory law, and all other laws including, but not limited to, all
contract, tort, and property disputes will be subject to binding arbitration in accord
with this Contract. The parties agree and understand that the-arbitrator shall have
all powers provided by the law and the Contract ... [including] money damages,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Notwithstanding anything hereunto the
contrary, Assignee retains an option to use judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce
a security agreement relating to the Manufactured Home secured in a transaction
underlying this arbitration agreement, to enforce the monetary obligation secured
by the Manufactured Home or to foreclose on the Manufactured Home .... The
initiation and maintenance of an action or judicial relief in a court [on the
foregoing terms] shall not constitute a waiver of the right of any party to compel
arbitration regarding any other dispute or remedy subject to arbitration in this
Contract, including the filing of a counterclaim in a suit brought by Assignee
pursuant to this provision.
Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1151 (alterations in original).
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contract. 46 In reply to Randolph's claim, counsel for the defendants filed a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement. 47 The
district court granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and
Randolph appealed. 48
In reversing the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the arbitration clause was unenforceable because the clause defeated the
remedial purpose of the Truth in Lending Act by potentially exposing the
consumer to bear the costs and expenses of the arbitration hearings. 49
Because the arbitration clause "provides no guarantee that a consumer
successfully arbitrating under this clause will not be saddled with a
prohibitive costs order," 50 the court rationalized that the arbitration clause
would essentially defeat a customer's "ability to vindicate her statutory
rights [under the Truth in Lending Act]." 5 1
The similar facts and conflicting holdings of Harris and Randolph
illustrate a looming problem with the use of arbitration clauses as a part of
consumer contracts. On the one hand are business and lending institutions
which increasingly are using standardized arbitration language in their
consumer contracts as a means for swift and cost-effective devices to
resolve disputes with their customers. 52 On the other hand are consumers,
who, like the Harrises and Larketta Randolph, often are unsophisticated
and unfamiliar with what, precisely, arbitration entails and the possible
ramifications arbitration can have on their ability to resolve conflicts with
lendors or vendors. Indeed, consumer advocates are clamoring against the
use of standardized arbitration clauses in consumer contracts because of the
effects such clauses have upon a consumer's ability to protect himself from
unfair deceptive practices or from defective products.53
46 See id. at 1151-52.
47 See id. at 1152.
48 See id. The district court judge also declined Randolph's request for certification
of a class of individuals who had entered into similar agreements with Green Tree and
dismissed Randolph's case with prejudice. See id.
49 See id. at 1157.
50 Id. at 1158.
51 Id.
52 See Miller, supra note 2, at 302.
53 See id. Consumer advocates are wary of the use of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts for the following reasons: (1) as a practical matter, consumers often
do not negotiate the contracts they sign (which are often "take it or leave it" contracts)
and therefore do not have any real choice but to arbitrate; (2) the costs of arbitration
are often exorbitant, particularly in light of the amounts typically in dispute in
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The arguments of the plaintiffs against the enforceability of the
arbitration clause in Harris and the-Eleventh Circuit's rationale for deeming
the arbitration clause in Randolph unenforceable reflect one legal approach
that consumers have adopted to invalidate arbitration clauses-to argue that
the clause is simply unfair, or, in legal terms, unconscionable. 54 Given the
disparate holdings of the courts in Harris and Randolph regarding nearly
identical arbitration clauses by the same lending institution, one easily can
come to the conclusion that the success of a challenge against the validity of
an arbitration clause by a consumer now and in the future will depend upon
how consumers set out to prove that an arbitration clause is substantively
unconscionable and which theories are available to the consumer..
As explained above, the plaintiffs in Harris attempted to prove the
substantive unconscionability of their arbitration agreement by arguing that
their consent to arbitrate lacked mutual consideration to arbitrate from
Green Tree. 55 An analysis of recent arbitration law indicates that the Harris
decision is in line with many federal and state jurisdictions that are
consumer matters; (3) there is no judge or a jury in arbitration and thus a sense of
"fairness" is lost; (4) the American Arbitration Association advises its arbitrators that
no written explanation of their decisions is required and there is virtually no
opportunity to appeal an arbitrator's decision because appeal requires a showing of
fraud or corruption; (5) a lack of public access to arbitration proceedings shields the
process from public scrutiny for possible abuses in the system; (6) there is very limited
access to discovery in the arbitration process, which potentially hinders consumers'
ability to prove fraudulent activity; (7) it is unclear whether class actions may be
brought in arbitration proceedings; and (8) it is unclear whether arbitration actions will
provide for attorney's fees for consumers which are available to successful consumers
under certain consumer protection legislation. See id. at 303-04.
54 According to Miller, there are three "exceptions," elucidated from recent
precedent, to the general rule that arbitration clauses are enforceable that a consumer
can proffer, as follows: (1) the arbitration clause is not applicable to the relevant
dispute; (2) the FAA does not apply to the contract, allowing relevant state law to
apply; and (3) the arbitration clause is invalid. See id. at 304. The last of the three
elucidated arguments is founded upon the language of section 2 of the FAA, which
provides that an agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
55 See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999). While
mutuality and substantive unconscionability sometimes are identified as two separate
theories to attack an arbitration agreement, these theories "overlapol substantially" in
the sense that the imbalance of bargaining power characterized as substantively
unconscionable directly results from the lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement.
Id. at 183. Thus, this author treats a lack of mutuality as anargument of substantive
unconscionabiity.
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reluctant to strike down an arbitration agreement simply because of a lack
of mutuality or because of a weakness in the procedural machinery of the
agreement.56
Driving the decisions of the courts in those cases involving a lack of
mutuality argument is the policy of favoring arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution. 57 Perhaps courts addressing the arguments of plaintiffs
like the Harrises are wary of invalidating arbitration clauses based upon a
lack of mutuality for fear that such an invalidation would be interpreted as
being tantamount to a holding that states that arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution is less effective or less trustworthy than the judicial
system. In other words, lack of a choice of forum is simply not
unconscionable enough in this context because arbitration, in the eyes of
most courts, is not an inherently inferior methodology of dispute
resolution. 58
Unlike the plaintiffs in Harris, the plaintiff in Randolph was able to
bring a suit based upon the Truth in Lending Act which, as stated above,
provides a statutory remedy against unfair or deceptive practices by
lenders. 59 In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit elucidated that when an
arbitration agreement serves to defeat the remedial purpose of a statute by
saddling consumers with arbitration costs and by preventing consumers
from bringing an action, such arbitration clauses are unenforceable. 60 This
"unconscionability because of cost" analysis has been utilized by other
56 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1011-12
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (upholding an arbitration agreement under the theory that parties are
not required to have similar remedies in case of breach); Lackey v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 904-05 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding an arbitration
agreement between a consumer and lender because the court could not assume that an
arbitral forum is prejudicial in comparison to a judicial forum). But see Arnold v.
United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1998) (holding an
arbitration clause unconscionable due to an inadequate balance of bargaining power).
57 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (stating that the FAA "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements").
58 See id. at 24-25 (suggesting that arbitration should be accorded the same
standing and legitimacy as other forms of dispute resolution by stating that "as a matter
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration").
59 See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1994 & Supp. III 1997);
see also supra note 43.
60 See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 178 F.3d 1149, 1156 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
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courts61 and represents a viable means by which consumers can invalidate
unfair standardized arbitration clauses in consumer contracts; a cost
unconscionability argument is even more compelling if the allegation of a
violation of a federal remedial statute is involved with their dispute. 62
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, it appears that courts will abrogate their proarbitration policy and
invalidate arbitration clauses in standardized consumer 'contracts if
consumers can demonstrate prejudice beyond the of lack of a choice
regarding forum of dispute resolution. Consumers who are able to
demonstrate that a given arbitration clause is "truly" prejudicial, "i.e., who
are able to demonstrate that an arbitration clause that somehow affects their
remedial rights under federal or state law or is unduly costly to them (as the
plaintiff in Randolph successfully argued), will succeed in their attempts to
invalidate consumer contracts containing boilerplate arbitration language.
The above conclusion manifests a fair compromise of the judicial system's
statutory and precedential obligation to uphold arbitration agreements and
their duty to protect consumers' rights. Future case law will further
elucidate the parameters of this compromise by the courts and will be
instructive to lenders and vendors on how to structure their arbitration
clauses so as to avoid a challenge based upon substantive unconscionability
by consumers.
Arbitration clauses are becoming increasingly commonplace in
consumer contracts such as retail sales contracts, 63 in invoices for products
shipped to consumers,64 and in bank account agreements. 65 The use of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and the spawn of a proarbitration
federal policy has had significant effects upon the way consumers may
combat the unfair and deceptive practices of crooked venders and lenders.
61 See, e.g., Myers v. Terminex Int'l Co., 697 N.E.2d 277, 280-81 (Ohio Ct.
Comm. Pleas 1998) (holding that an arbitration clause charging customers in the form
of a nonrefundable filing fee was unconscionable and thus unenforceable).
62 See Miller, supra note 2, at 305-06.
63 See id. at 302.
64 See id: (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997)).
65 See id. (citing Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers
and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsp. RESOL. 267, 327 & n.468 (1995); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 54 & n.59).
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The facts of Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp.66 illustrate the means by
which courts have condoned the use of arbitration clauses in contracts of
adhesion to limit consumers' remedies for unsatisfactory service through
mandatory arbitration while preserving the lender's or vendor's right to
litigate. Federal proarbitration policy has influenced courts to validate
arbitration clauses in most cases.
Harris and similar cases have demonstrated that unconscionability of
arbitration clauses within standardized consumer contracts is not so easily
argued; the mere existence of an inbalance in bargaining power that exists
in favor of the vendor simply is not reason enough for some state and
federal jurisdictions to invalidate an arbitration agreement. 67 However, as
Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama6s demonstrates, if
consumers are able to frame their unconscionability argument based upon
the inordinate cost to the consumer, or if the arbitration clause violates
consumers' rights for redress under a specific statutory regime, a successful
invalidation of the arbitration clause in favor of the consumer can be
expected. 69
Philip Bautista
66 183 F.3d 173.(3d Cir. 1999).
67 See id. at 183.
68 178 F.3d 1149 (1lth Cir. 1999).
69 See id. at 1159.
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